


















































I propose a model in which credentials, such as diplomas, are intrinsically valu-
able; a situation described as credentialism. The model overcomes an important crit-
icism of signaling models by mechanically tying a worker’s wages to their productiv-
ity. A worker’s productivity is inﬂuenced by the skills of their coworkers, where such
skills arise from an ability-augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with
coworkers. A worker’s credentials allow them to demonstrate their investment to the
labor market, thereby allowing workers to match with high-skill coworkers in equilib-
rium. Despite the positive externality associated with a worker’s investment, I show
how over-investment is pervasive in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
There are at least two interpretations of the dramatic increase in educational attainment
experienced in the post-war period in many countries. The ﬁrst is that it represents a
natural response to the changing nature of work, including the implementation of new
technologies that require high skilled labor. A second perspective asserts that educational
attainment is fueled, in part, by credentialism, whereby workers have an intrinsic demand
for credentials. Proponents of this perspective assert that “credentialing, not educating,
has become the primary business of North American universities”, that a “resume without
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1one or more degrees from a respected institution will not be taken seriously enough even
to be considered, no matter how able or informed the applicant may be”, and that eco-
nomic forces have made “credentials the object rather than the byproduct of educational
achievement”.1
These two interpretations are by no means mutually exclusive, and it is of great policy
relevance to understand the relative contribution of each. Despite decades of intensive
research in labor economics, the literature is yet to reach a solid consensus on the relative
magnitudes of each explanation. I believe this is due, in no small part, to a tension that
exists between the plausibility of credentialism on the one hand, and the absence of a
compelling underlying theory of credentialism on the other. The development of such a
theory is the primary objective of this paper.
Economists have typically used models of signaling (and/or screening) to understand
credentialism.2 These models focus on the worker-ﬁrm relationship, where credentials
inherit an intrinsic value because they affect the beliefs, and therefore the willingness to
pay wages, of the ﬁrm. The relevance of this mechanism has been placed in serious doubt
in recent years, as criticisms have been levied on signaling theory’s heavy reliance on an
unrealistic assumption: that a worker’s wages are largely insensitive to their performance.
The criticism is summed up nicely as the idea “that companies rather quickly discover
the productivity of employees who went to college, whether a Harvard or a University of
Pheonix. Before long, their pay adjusts to their productivity rather than to their education
credentials” (Becker (2006)). The assumption that wages are insensitive to performance
is not only intuitively unpalatable, it is not in accordance with the evidence regarding the
prominence of explicit performance pay (Lemieux et al. (2009)), nor with the estimates of
the speed of employer learning (Lange (2007), and Arcidiacono et al. (2008)).
Although this type of argument is damaging for the practical relevance of traditional
signaling theory in the labor context, it raises the issue of what we are to make of the
widely expressed credentialist sentiment3, and of the empirical evidence that has amassed
over the decades in support of signaling.4 Rather than dismiss the practical relevance of
credentialism altogether, I propose an alternative model that addresses the above criticism.
1The ﬁrst two quotes are from Jane Jacobs’ book, Dark Age Ahead (Jacobs (2004) [pp. 44-45]), while the
third quote is from David F. Labaree’s book, How to Succeed in School Without Really Learning (Labaree
(1997), [p. 253]).
2Seminal work of course includes Spence (1973), Spence (1974), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Arrow
(1973).
3For example, as expressed in the sociological literature (e.g. Labaree (1997), Brown (1995), Collins (1979)
and Berg (1970)) and in the popular press (e.g. Jacobs (2004)).
4For example, Tyler, Murnane, and Willet (2000), Lang and Kropp (1986), Bedard (2001), as well as others
surveyed in Weiss (1995), Ferrer and Riddell (2002), and Lange and Topel (2006).
2Speciﬁcally, I model an economy in which workers with heterogeneous abilities make
skill-enhancing investments prior to joining N-worker ﬁrms. A worker’s marginal produc-
tivity is shaped in part by this skill, but also in part by the skill of their coworkers. Once in
a ﬁrm, each worker exerts labor effort in order to produce a veriﬁable, individual output.
That is, there are no effort externalities, such as team production. The wage received by
a worker is mechanically tied to their productivity (e.g. output-contingent wage contracts).
This assumption is made in order to most cleanly address the above criticism of signaling
models. To be sure, output-contingent wage contracts imply that a worker’s productivity
is effectively observed immediately by the ﬁrm. Thus, in contrast to signaling, credentials
play no role in inﬂuencing beliefs within the worker-ﬁrm relationship. Instead, credentials
play a role in shaping the composition of coworker groups, thereby exerting inﬂuence on
the worker-coworker relationship.
The assignment of workers to ﬁrms - i.e. to other coworkers - unfolds on the basis
of workers’ investments (as opposed to skills). This feature reﬂects a situation in which
skills are ‘soft’ - prohibitively difﬁcult to describe, quantify, and communicate - relative to
investments. For example, it is much easier to accurately communicate one’s educational
history on a resume than it is to communicate one’s creativity, punctuality, or honesty.
Given this, workers tend to be hired, and therefore exposed to coworkers, on the basis of
their quantiﬁable investment history rather than on loose claims of being ‘skilled’.
Since higher types make higher investments in equilibrium, all workers ﬁnd those with
higher investments more desirable as coworkers. All stable matches will therefore involve
positive assortative matching on the investment dimension. Following the literature (e.g.
Peters (2007a), Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2009), Peters and Siow (2002)) I model the
matching process by imposing positive assortative matching. This approach imposes disci-
plines the analysis; not only does it produce a stable matching outcome in equilibrium, it
also imposes concrete consequences associated with making off-equilibrium investments.5
Given these basic ingredients, the mechanism is simple: credentials acquire an intrinsic
value because they grant access to groups of higher-skilled coworkers. After establishing
the existence and uniqueness of separating equilibria, I show how over-investment in ed-
ucation is pervasive in equilibrium. I then explore how changes in the degree of spillovers
inﬂuences investment, output, and payoffs, and demonstrate that the results are robust
5For example, stability alone does not rule out a situation in which the very lowest types are convinced to
make very high investments because of a concern that any lower investment would cause them to match with
very undesirable coworkers. This is unreasonable because no such undesirable coworkers exist: workers of
the lowest type are already the most undesirable workers in the matching market. See Peters (2007a) for an
elaboration on this issue.
3to a generalization of the function describing spillovers. In the discussion that follows, I
demonstrate the robustness of the theory to a situation in which workers are able to re-
place undesirable coworkers prior to the commencement of production, as well as discuss
how the theory could be tested against related theories. I conclude with the hope that the
framework studied here provides a useful basis from which to evaluate the signiﬁcance of
credentialism in the labor market.
1.1 Relationship to the Literature
The possibility that education infers positive externalities has long been recognized, but
standard treatments are ‘global’ in the sense that all agents in a given region beneﬁt from
some measure of aggregate educational investment (e.g. Lucas (1988), and Moretti (2004)).
In contrast, spillovers in this model are ‘local’ in that they occur within the boundaries
of the ﬁrm.6 This approach opens the possibility that individuals inﬂuence who they
match with by choosing appropriate investments. This is a central feature of the model
and one that distinguishes it from models of matching with exogenous characteristics (e.g.
two-sided matching; Becker (1973), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and Legros and Newman
(2002) and (2007), search and matching; Shimer and Smith (2000), Smith (2006), and Bur-
dett and Coles (1997), and assignment; Sattinger (1993) and Kremer (1993)) and models
with endogenous characteristics where potential partners are encountered randomly (Bur-
dett and Coles (2001)). I show how this ‘competition for coworkers’ reverses the standard
intuition that positive spillovers imply under-investment and that greater spillovers re-
duce investment.
The model is designed to capture the feature that there is often a disconnect between
the characteristics used to form matches and the characteristics that potential partners are
interested in. This aspect distinguishes the model from models of pre-marital investment,
where an agent’s attractiveness as a partner is completely captured by their observable
investment (e.g. Peters (2007b), Peters and Siow (2002), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(2001), Felli and Roberts (2002), Gall, Legros, and Newman (2006)).
An extreme form of this feature is prominent in a class of models in which the invest-
ment is unproductive and acts purely as a signal of an underlying characteristic (Hoppe,
Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), Rege (2008), Damiano and Li (2007), and Bidner (2010)). The
analysis here complements these models by exploring the consequences of productive in-
vestment. Although this type of extension is largely trivial in standard signaling models,
it produces a number of additional insights and subtleties in the present context. For in-
6In this way, ﬁrms take on some key properties of ‘clubs’ in the sense of Buchanan (1965).
4stance, I show that separating equilibria involve a continuous investment function only
if investment is unproductive. Furthermore, productive investment allows one to drop
the assumption of complementary interaction between workers, and therefore removes the
central trade-off studied in the case of unproductive investments (investments are waste-
ful but facilitate efﬁcient matching). However, a new trade-off emerges in which the over-
investment inherent in a separating equilibrium is compared with the under-investment
inherent in random matching. Finally, having productive investment allows one to study
the impact of spillovers on aggregate variables such as output and inequality, whereas
such impacts are absent when investment is unproductive since they are determined by
the exogenous distribution of types.7
In a similar setting, Hopkins (2005) studies an economy in which workers make po-
tentially productive investments prior to being paired with a ﬁrm. The papers share the
feature that workers invest in order to secure a job in a ‘good’ ﬁrm, but differ in the account
of why ﬁrms are heterogeneous. There, ﬁrms are exogenously heterogeneous, whereas here
ﬁrms are ex-ante homogeneous and are only differentiated in equilibrium because of the
human resources they house.
1.2 Foundations of Key Assumptions
Far from ignoring the relevance of the ‘changing nature of work’ interpretation of recent
educational attainment, the theory developed here is built upon salient features of the
modern workplace. Technical progress has not only increased the physical proximity of
workers, but has also changed the types of tasks performed, the ways in which labor is
managed, and the nature of the relationship a worker has with their coworkers. These
changes have altered the types of skills that are valuable in the labor market. For instance,
in compiling a list of these ‘new basic skills’, Murnane and Levy (1996) write:
A surprise in the list of New Basic Skills is the importance of soft skills. These
skills are called “soft” because they are not easily measured on standardized
tests. In reality, there is nothing soft about them. Today more than ever, good
ﬁrms expect employees to raise performance continually by learning from each
other through written and oral communication and by group problem solving.
The earlier part of this quote inspires the assumption that skills are ‘soft’, whereas the
latter part inspires the assumption of skill spillovers. Extending this theme, Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) and Levy and Murnane (2004) argue that computers can not easily
7Although, see Bidner (2008) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1995) for models in which the underlying
characteristics being signaled are endogenous.
5perform non-routine tasks, and document the growing importance of tasks related to ex-
pert thinking (“solving problems for which there are no rule-based solutions”), and complex
communication (“interacting with humans to acquire information, to explain it, or to per-
suade others of its implications for action”). A worker’s ability to perform such tasks is
reasonably sensitive to the skills of their coworkers: expert thinking is often a collabora-
tive process that involves input from multiple people and perspectives, whereas complex
communication is an inherently inter-personal process.
Skill spillovers may also arise as the result of changes in the way a workforce is man-
aged. Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) describe recent trends in Human Resource Manage-
ment, such as the importance of “pay-for-performance plans like gain-sharing or proﬁt-
sharing, problem-solving teams, broadly deﬁned jobs, cross-training for multiple jobs, em-
ployment security policies and labor-management communication procedures”. Many of
these practices enhance the interconnectedness of employees. For example, Gant, Ich-
niowski, and Shaw (2002) provide evidence that worker productivity is improved following
the introduction of innovative work practices because of stronger social capital developed
between workers, and Drago and Garvey (1998) ﬁnd that ‘helping effort’ is more readily
expended by workers engaged in a large variety of tasks.
The model is presented in Section 2 and analyzed in Section 3. The model’s robustness
is examined in Section 4 and some comments on empirical implications are made in Section
5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. Proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Model
There is a continuum of workers, indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each worker draws an ability, θi,
from some absolutely continuous distribution, F, with support Θ ≡ [θ0,θ 1] where 0 <θ 0 ≤
θ1 < ∞. Having observed their ability, workers make an investment, x ≥ 0, at a cost of cx.
This investment produces a skill of:
s(x,θ)=θ · g(x),
where g is a strictly increasing and concave function which satisﬁes the usual regularity
conditions: limx→0 g (x)=∞ and limx→∞ g (x)=0 . That is, all types face diminishing
marginal returns to investment. The key assumption embodied in this speciﬁcation is that
the marginal return to investment is greater for higher types. This type of property arises
naturally when ability is interpreted as an ‘aptitude for comprehension’ or a ‘capacity to
learn’ (as opposed to an endowment of knowledge), and is commonly employed in the em-
6pirical literature.8
Given an investment of xi, and a consumption of wi, agent i simply obtains a payoff of
wi − c · xi. Of course, the amount available for an agent to consume depends upon their
investment and the details of this relationship are now explored.
2.1 The Matching Stage
Workers take their investments to the matching stage, in which they are assigned to ﬁrms
(and therefore coworkers). An assignment of workers to ﬁrms links each worker with
exactly one ﬁrm, in such a way that each ﬁrm has either zero or N workers linked to
it. The N workers linked to a particular ﬁrm are said to be matched. Following Peters
(2007a), Hoppe, et al. (2009) and Peters and Siow (2002), I assume matching is positive
assortative on investment. This means that for all pairs of workers (i,j),i fxi ≥ xj then the
lowest investment made by those workers matched with i is at least as great as the largest
investment made by those workers matched with j. The deﬁnition of positive assortative
matching is expanded upon below once we focus on separating equilibria.
2.2 The Production Stage
Consider a particular ﬁrm that hires N workers. Each worker produces a veriﬁable indi-
vidual output, Yi, by exerting effort. Speciﬁcally, given an effort of ei and a productivity of
yi, worker i produces a total output of
Yi = yi · ei. (1)
Importantly, production is individualistic in the sense that a worker’s output is not affected
by the effort choices of other workers: there is no team production, sabotage, production
line technology, or anything like that. I assume that effort is inelastically supplied at one
unit to avoid making the analysis needlessly complicated. However, it is useful to keep
in mind the fact that there are no effort externalities with ﬁrms. Instead, the salience of
coworkers comes solely from the feature that a worker’s productivity, yi, is derived in part
from the skill of coworkers. In particular, I assume:
yi = y(si,s−i) ≡ (1 − φ) · si + φ · s−i, (2)
where s−i ≡ (N − 1)−1 ·

j =i sj is the average skill of i’s coworkers within the ﬁrm, and
φ ∈ (0,1] parameterizes the degree of skill spillovers. This parameterization is convenient
8For example, multiplicative separability is implicitly assumed whenever a log wage equation is additively
separable in schooling and ability. Evidence of investment-ability complementarity (i.e. a demonstration that
returns to education are increasing in ability) is surveyed in Weiss (1995).
7for at least three reasons. First, it ensures that spillovers are neutral in the sense that
the average productivity across workers is independent of φ. Second, it stresses the point
that complementarity interaction (i.e. y having a positive cross-partial derivative) is not
necessary once we allow for productive investment. Third, it allows for a clean comparison
with related literature (Peters and Siow (2002)). I offer a generalization of this form in
section 4, where I show that separating equilibria under the more general formation are
exactly the same as the separating equilibrium arising in the more speciﬁc setting.
In order to address the criticism of standard signaling models as cleanly as possible, I
assume that workers are simply paid their output: wi = Yi.9 This is equivalent to ﬁrms
offering worker i a wage per unit of effort that is mechanically tied to i’s marginal produc-
tivity of effort. Standard signaling models require that such contracts are infeasible.
2.3 Separating Equilibrium
From here, I focus on separating equilibria. Besides providing a natural comparison with
the existing literature, I show that separating equilibria are more robust than pooling
equilibria when workers are able to replace undesirable coworkers, as explained in Section
4.2 below. A separating equilibrium is a pair of objects - a strictly increasing investment
function and a return function. The investment function is required to reﬂect optimizing
behavior given the return function, and the return function is required to be consistent
with the distribution of equilibrium investments and positive assortative matching. Each
of these aspects are considered in turn.
2.3.1 Optimality
If a worker of type θ invests x and has coworkers with an average skill of ¯ s, then their
payoff is:
U(x,θ, ¯ s)=( 1− φ) · s(x,θ)+φ · ¯ s − c · x. (3)
These preferences are depicted, in the left panel of Figure 1, in (x, ¯ s) space as U-shaped
indifference curves. The U-shape comes from the fact that at relatively low investment
levels the marginal return to investment is greater than the marginal cost, implying that a
marginally higher investment raises the payoff - which requires a lower average coworker
9Since there are no effort externalities, this contract maximizes the total surplus available within a ﬁrm.
That is, ﬁrms would have no incentive to offer wage contracts that were also conditioned on the output of
others in the ﬁrm (e.g. team performance contracts) since such contracts can not increase the total available
surplus, and may actually distort effort decisions. Competition from other ﬁrms would ensure that the entire
output is returned to the worker in the form of wages.
8skill to retain indifference. The reverse is true for relatively high investment levels. In
addition, the fact that the marginal return to investment is higher for higher types implies
a single-crossing property (also indicated in the left panel of Figure 1, where θ  >θ ).10
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Figure 1: Preferences and Optimality
When making investment decisions, workers understand that positive assortative match-
ing will imply that the average skill of their coworkers will be sensitive to their investment.
Workers conjecture that an investment of x leads them to be assigned to a ﬁrm in which





The optimality of investments is indicated in the right panel of Figure 1. Given the return
function, μ, workers simply choose the investment level that places them on the highest
possible indifference curve.
2.3.2 Matching
Given that all others invest according to a strictly increasing function of type, σ :Θ→ R+,
positive assortative matching implies that ﬁrms are segregated in equilibrium. That is, all
ﬁrms hire workers of at most one type. Thus we can speak of ‘type θ’ ﬁrms, and note that
feasibility implies that type θ ﬁrms exist with a density of F (θ)/N. When considering the
implication of making a particular investment, agent i takes this segregation as given as
realizes that they will end up at a segregated ﬁrm for any investment they choose. The
type of ﬁrm that a worker is assigned to will of course depend on the investment made.
10The U-shapedness and single-crossing properties are easily veriﬁed by consulting the explicit expression
for an indifference curve: I(θ)=( 1 /φ) · [u + c · x − (1 − φ) · s(x,θ)].
9To get at this, let the distribution of investment be given by G. Positive assortative
matching requires that an investment of x leads i to be matched with a segregated ﬁrm
containing workers of type t(x), where the position of x in the investment distribution
equals the position of σ(t(x)) in the investment distribution. Given that investment is a
strictly increasing function of type, the latter equals the position of t(x) in the type distri-
bution. Thus, positive assortative matching requires that for each x, t(x) satisfy
G(x)=F(t(x)). (5)
To see that this uniquely deﬁnes t(x) for each x ∈ R, consider the distribution of invest-
ment, G, as depicted in Figure 2. Since the lowest investment arising in equilibrium is
σ(θ0), we have that G(x)=0for all x lower than this amount. Similarly, the highest
investment arising in equilibrium is σ(θ1),s ow eh a v eG(x)=1for investments higher
than this amount. If we consider an investment that happens to arise in equilibrium, say
x = σ(θ), then we know that G(x)=F(θ) since investment is a strictly increasing function
of type. Finally, if the investment function exhibits a discontinuity, say at θd, then G will
be ﬂat on an interval above or below (or both) σ(θd) as indicated.
G(x)






Figure 2: Positive Assortative Matching
For any value of x we see that there exists a unique value of θ such that G(x)=F(θ).
This value of θ, by deﬁnition, is t(x). This has immediate consequences for choosing an
equilibrium investment: if x = σ(θ), then t(x)=θ. That is, if a worker invests an amount
that happens to be an equilibrium investment for some type, then the worker is matched
with coworkers of that type. However, positive assortative matching also has implications
for off-equilibrium investments. For instance, investing anything less than the lowest equi-
librium investment implies that a worker is to be matched with workers of the lowest type.
Similarly, investing more than the highest equilibrium investment implies a worker is to
be matched with workers of the highest type. The only remaining possibility is investing
in the neighborhood of a discontinuity, such as the region around σ(θd) as depicted in Fig-
10ure 2. In this case, positive assortative matching requires that workers be matched with
coworkers of type θd.
Positive assortative matching therefore places restrictions on the equilibrium return
function; by investing x a worker matches with coworkers of type t(x), and since such
coworkers invest σ(t(x)) in equilibrium, they have a skill of s(σ(t(x)),t(x)). Thus, given
a strictly increasing investment function, σ, we say that the return function, μ, satisﬁes
positive assortative matching if
μ(x)=s(σ(t(x)),t(x)), (6)
for all x ∈ R, where t(x) satisﬁes (5).
Deﬁnition 1. A separating equilibrium is a strictly increasing investment function, σ :
Θ → R+, and a return function, μ : R+ → R+, such that i) σ is optimal given μ, and ii) μ
satisﬁes positive assortative matching given σ. That is, equations (4) and (6) hold.
2.4 Benchmarks
Before turning to the derivation of separating equilibria, it is useful to present some bench-
mark investment levels. First, consider the investment made by type θ if they took as given
the fact that they were to be matched with coworkers who were also of type θ. This invest-
ment level is called the Nash investment for type θ workers as it represents the Nash
equilibrium of the game in which N workers of the same type simultaneously choose an in-
vestment level and obtain payoffs according to (3). By taking the average skill of coworkers
as ﬁxed, workers effectively face a ﬂat return function. Workers then choose the invest-
ment that places them on the highest indifference curve that lies on this return function.
An investment is a Nash investment for some type if the skill generated by this invest-
ment coincides with the average skill initially conjectured. This is represented by point N
in Figure 3, where xN(θ) is the Nash investment for type θ.
The Nash investment is relevant because workers of the lowest type, θ0, must make
their Nash investment in equilibrium. The standard reasoning applies: they can do no
worse than be matched with type θ0 coworkers and therefore must ﬁnd their Nash invest-
ment to be a best response. Thus:
σ(θ0)=xN(θ0). (7)
The Nash investment is inefﬁcient, and as expected, represents an under-investment
because each of the N workers are better off if each of them invest a little more. Naturally,















Figure 3: Benchmark Investments
beneﬁts the others. The efﬁcient investment for workers of type θ can be found as that
investment that places workers on the highest indifference curve on the skill production
function. This is represented by point E in Figure 3, where x∗(θ) is the efﬁcient investment
for type θ.
As workers invest amounts increasingly greater than the efﬁcient level, their payoffs
decrease. At some point there will be an investment level that gives workers a payoff equal
to that arising with Nash investment. This is referred to as the upper-Nash investment,
and is represented by point N  in Figure 3, where x 
N(θ) is the upper-Nash investment for
type θ.
The signiﬁcance of the upper-Nash investment level is that it places restrictions on
the types of investments that can be made by workers with types marginally above θ0.
Speciﬁcally, it can not be the case that limθ→θ0 σ(θ) <x  
N(θ0). If this were true, e.g. at a
point like a in Figure 3, then workers of type θ0 would prefer to deviate by mimicking a
type marginally above θ0 (since a lies on a higher indifference curve). Similarly, it can not
be the case that limθ→θ0 σ(θ) >x  
N(θ0). If this were true, e.g. at a point like b, then types
marginally above θ0 would prefer to deviate by mimicking type θ0 workers (since b lies on





With this minimal structure, we already have the following.
12Result 1. If investment is productive, then there does not exist a separating equilibrium
with a continuous investment function. Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium investment function
must be discontinuous at θ0.
Simply, productive investment implies xN(θ) <x  
N(θ).11 But if this is true, (7) and
(8) together imply that the investment function can not be continuous at θ0. This result
suggests a way in which equilibrium behavior is qualitatively affected by considering pro-
ductive investment.
2.5 Solving
Having placed restrictions on investment behavior for the lowest types, we are ready to
explore how all other types invest. Since t(z) is a non-decreasing function, so too is μ. Thus,
μ is almost everywhere differentiable. In fact, μ must be differentiable at all investments
made by interior types.12 Thus, for all θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1), the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal
investment implies that:
(1 − φ) · sx(x,θ)+φ · μ (x)=c (9)
at x = σ(θ). Since (6) holds uniformly for x ∈ (x 
N(θ0),σ(θ1)), we can differentiate both
sides of (6) to get:
μ (x)=sx(x,t(x)) + sθ(x,t(x)) · t (x), (10)






c − t · g (x)
φ · g(x)
≡ Γ(t,x). (11)
Thus, we have that σ(θ)=t−1(θ) for θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1), where t is a solution to the initial values
problem deﬁned by t (x)=Γ ( t,x) and (θ0,x  
N(θ0)), where the initial conditions follow from
the analysis of the previous section.
Proposition 1. A unique separating equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, x(θ0)=
xN(θ0), and σ(θ)=t−1(θ) for θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1], where t is a solution to the initial values prob-
lem deﬁned by t (x)=Γ ( t,x) and (θ0,x  
N(θ0)).




N(θ) if (and only if) investment is
productive.
12Intuitively, if μ we not differentiable at σ(θ) then there would exist a neighborhood of types around θ that
would also prefer to invest σ(θ).
13The unique separating equilibrium is illustrated from two vantage points in Figure 4.
The left panel depicts the equilibrium return function in (x, ¯ s) space. The return function is
ﬂat for low investments, reﬂecting the fact that such investments all lead to a match with
type θ0 coworkers. There comes a point at which the return function makes a discrete jump
(i.e. at x = x 
N(θ0)). This reﬂects the fact that investing above this point allows workers to
match with some higher type who also makes a higher investment (and is therefore of a
higher skill). The return function increases continuously from this point, until the highest
equilibrium investment is reached. Beyond that point, the return function is once again
ﬂat. Importantly, each type ﬁnds their indifference curve to be tangential to the return
function at unique point, and this point lies on that type’s skill production function (which



















Figure 4: The Separating Equilibrium
The right panel of Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium investment function in (θ,x) space.
The function has a discontinuity at θ0, but is strictly increasing and continuous otherwise.
The continuous section is the inverse of the solution to the initial values problem. The
separable speciﬁcation for the skill production function is convenient, since it allows us to





















A higher investment not only raises a worker’s productivity, but also the productivity of
their coworkers. In this sense, investment entails a positive externality. If workers’ ex-
posure to spillovers were insensitive to their investment, as in models of global spillovers
such as Lucas (1988), then this naturally leads to underinvestment. Arguments along
these lines support the public subsidization of education. However, when investments al-
low workers to join higher skilled ﬁrms, this implication no longer holds (for almost all
workers).
Proposition 2. Almost all workers over-invest in equilibrium: σ(θ) >x ∗(θ) for θ ∈ Θ/θ0.
Notice that the under-investment intuition still holds for workers of the lowest type,
since they always make their Nash investment. But such workers exist in zero measure,
and in this sense, over-investment is pervasive in equilibrium. This observation points out
one value in modeling heterogeneous types, because the efﬁciency properties of equilibrium
are quite different if there is a single (and therefore, lowest) type.
The intuition for over-investment is clariﬁed by observing that workers perceive the net
marginal return to investment to be the sum of two components:
∂
∂x
{y(s(x,θ),μ(x)) − cx} = [(1 − φ) · sx − c]+[ φ · μ (x)]. (13)
The ﬁrst bracketed term is the ‘private’ component and the second is the ‘credential’ com-
ponent. Given segregation, the efﬁcient investment for type θ workers arises when workers
perceive the net marginal return to be the net marginal social return, sx − c. The private
component alone clearly produces too little incentive to invest, since the return suffers a
shortfall of φ · sx. This arises because the private return does not take into account the
external beneﬁt on coworkers. To explore the extent to which the credential component
provides added incentive to invest, note that (6) implies
μ(x)=s(x,t(x)) (14)
for all x = σ(θ) for some θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1). Since this holds uniformly in x on (σ(θ0),σ(θ1)),w e
can differentiate both sides of (14) and multiply by φ to get
φ · μ (x)=φ · sx + φ · sθ · t (x). (15)
Thus, the credential component contributes the required shortfall in the net marginal re-
turn, φ · sx. However, it contributes even more than this when φ · sθ · t (x) is positive. But,
15this term is always positive (when φ>0 and sθ > 0) because of simple fact that higher
types make higher investments. Thus, the model not only captures the feature that cre-
dentials have an intrinsic value, as captured by μ(x), but also veriﬁes that this leads to
over-investment.
The fact that agents invest efﬁciently in models of pre-marital investment with com-
plete information (such as Peters and Siow (2002)) can be seen partly as a consequence of
the fact that ‘skill’ in those models depends only on investment, and not on type (so that
sθ =0 ).
3.2 The Effect of Spillovers
Spillovers are ‘neutral’ in equilibrium in the sense that if we changed φ while holding
investment ﬁxed, no worker’s productivity would change. Given this, the following result
points to a mechanism through which spillovers raise productivity without making existing
skills more productive per se.
Proposition 3. An increase in spillovers increases the equilibrium investment, and there-
fore productivity, of almost all workers (those with types θ ∈ Θ/θ0).
Just as in the case where exposure to spillovers is insensitive to investment, higher
spillovers leads to lower welfare. This is not surprising given that spillovers are the source
of inefﬁciency in both constructions, but the mechanisms are quite different. For example,
here spillovers induce a negative relationship between output and welfare.
The following result indicates that spillovers are an indispensable component of the
mechanism producing over-investment.
Proposition 4. Investment becomes efﬁcient as spillovers disappear: σ(θ) → x∗(θ) as φ →
0.
Investment is clearly efﬁcient when there are no spillovers, so this result establishes a
certain continuity with that scenario. A corollary of this is that the investment function
becomes continuous in the limit as spillovers disappear.
4 Robustness
4.1 Skill Production Function Generalization
One may be concerned that the linear speciﬁcation of the skill production function is re-
sponsible for the main results. In this section I argue that this is not true by generalizing
16this function to the CES class, and demonstrating that separating equilibria are completely
unaffected.
Proposition 5. Generalize the skill production function to:
y(s, ¯ s)=[ ( 1− φ) · sρ + φ · ¯ sρ]
1
ρ , (16)
where ρ ∈ (−∞,1]. For any ρ, a unique separating equilibrium exists. Furthermore, it is
exactly the same equilibrium for all ρ.
The linear case considered above corresponds to ρ =1 , and this result tells us that
(literally) nothing would change if we had instead used a form that incorporates comple-
mentarity from the CES class. For example, the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief speciﬁcations
correspond to ρ → 0 and ρ →− ∞ , respectively. This highlights the point that it is the
weighting parameter, φ, and not the substitution parameter, ρ, that is important. The key
properties of CES forms that are responsible for this result are y(z,z)=z, ys(z,z)=( 1−φ),
and y¯ s(z,z)=φ for all z.
4.2 The Observability of Skill
The explanation for credentialism developed here avoids an important criticism of signal-
ing models by allowing for output-contingent wages. This can be thought of as effectively
capturing an extreme version of employer learning, since ﬁrms need not commit to wage
payments prior to observing productivity. Since the mechanism relies on the fact that work-
ers can not feasibly be sorted into ﬁrms on the basis of their skill, it is reasonable that one
may foster a degree of skepticism regarding the plausibility of the proposed explanation on
the basis that a worker’s skill may also be learned quickly.
If only the ﬁrm learns their workers’ skills then nothing would change. This is simply
because ﬁrms are only interested in skill insofar as it affects productivity, and output con-
tingent wages allows ﬁrms to act as if they observed productivity. On the other extreme,
if the market observes worker skill then the environment is more appropriately modeled
as in the spirit of Peters and Siow (2002), Peters (2007b), or Cole et al. (2001) - e.g. have
matches formed positive assortative along the skill dimension. Investment loses its cre-
dential quality in this setting, thereby invalidating the explanation proposed here.
However, the assumption that the market observes worker skills is highly demanding.
For instance, a worker’s skill can not be inferred from information on investment and out-
put alone, since coworkers exert an inﬂuence on output.13 Even if matching were positive
13Even if coworker skill can be inferred from equilibrium behavior, many equilibria can potentially be sup-
ported because of the ﬂexibility in assigning off-equilibrium beliefs.
17assortative on some aggregate of investment and output (e.g. in a repeated setting) invest-
ment still retains a credential quality since this helps raise observed output via spillovers.
Thus, a situation in which skill is observed by the market seems quite implausible be-
cause of the quite detailed information on all of a worker’s coworkers that is required. This
implausibility is only heightened if output is observed with noise or subject to external
shocks.
4.3 Option to Re-match
The static nature of the model may arouse suspicion that the results are reliant on the fact
that workers are, in effect, bonded to their coworkers. That is, the model does not capture
the reality that the “credential is not a passport to a job, as naive graduates sometimes
suppose. It is more basic and necessary: a passport to consideration for a job”, Jacobs
(2004). That is, one may conjecture that the extent of over-investment will be reduced if
workers can be rejected from ﬁrms if they are found to not be of a suitable skill. Intuitively,
the possibility of rejection lowers incentives to invest since a high-skill ﬁrm is no longer
bound to accept a masquerading worker.
To explore this, I now consider a simple extension of the above model in which matching
occurs in two stages. Potential ﬁrms are formed in the ﬁrst stage according to positive
assortative on investment as before. These are only potential ﬁrms because of two reasons
- i) a small proportion of potential ﬁrms are exogenously dissolved at the end of the ﬁrst
stage, and ii) workers can decide to reject potential coworkers for an arbitrarily small
cost, κ>0. A worker is rejected from the ﬁrm if all of their coworkers decide to reject
them. In the second stage, all workers from dissolved ﬁrms are once again matched positive
assortative on investment, some of who will ﬁll the positions left by rejected workers. The
rejected workers are not rematched (e.g. they are stigmatized). All other workers remain
with their ﬁrst-stage matches. A worker’s coworkers are those that they are matched with
at the end of the second stage.
If we hold ﬁxed the original equilibrium investment function, then no worker has an
incentive to eject any of their coworkers since an ejected worker would simply be replaced
by an identical worker in the second stage, but a positive cost is incurred. However, the
point is that the option to eject undesirable coworkers could potentially alter investment
incentives. Speciﬁcally, the over-investment observed in the original equilibrium could be
drastically reduced because of lowered incentives to masquerade as a higher type; mas-
queraders will be ejected by their potential coworkers for small enough switching costs.
To explore this possibility, consider a ﬁrm that consists of workers that invest x and
18are of type t(x). Suppose that workers in this ﬁrm, which have a skill of s(x,t(x)), are
confronted with a deviating worker who instead has a skill of ˜ s. Each of the non-deviating
workers therefore have an average coworker skill of
¯ s(˜ s,x) ≡
1
N − 1




and will almost surely be re-matched with a coworker with skill s(x,t(x)) if they reject the
deviating worker. Thus, workers will not reject the deviating worker as long as ˜ s ≥ s∗(x),
where s∗(x) satisﬁes
U (σ(t(x)),t(x), ¯ s(s∗(x),x)) − κ = U (σ(t(x)),t(x),s(x,t(x))). (18)
That is, workers will not punish the deviation if the induced change in average coworker
skill does not justify the switching cost.
We are interested in determining the conditions under which the original equilibrium
remains an equilibrium in this new setting. To this end, suppose all other workers are
investing according to the original equilibrium σ. The optimal investment problem now is
max
x≥0
U(x,θ,s(x,t(x))), s.t. s(x,θ) ≥ s∗(x). (19)
If we ignore the constraint, then the solution to this problem is, by deﬁnition, σ(θ). Thus,
σ(θ) must still be an equilibrium if we can be sure that the constraint is satisﬁed at x =
σ(θ):
s(σ(θ),θ) ≥ s∗(σ(θ)). (20)
But, from the deﬁnition of s∗(x) and the fact that κ>0, we know that s∗(x) <s (x,t(x)).
Using the fact that x = σ(θ) in this inequality implies that the constraint indeed does al-
ways hold. I conclude that the original equilibrium remains an equilibrium when workers
can reject undesirable potential coworkers at an arbitrarily small cost.
Intuitively, suppose workers invest according to some arbitrary strictly increasing func-
tion, ˜ σ. For any positive switching cost there is a set of investments lying above ˜ σ(θ) that
they can make without being rejected by the resulting match. If ˜ σ is to be an equilibrium
investment function, then it must ensure that workers have no incentive to marginally in-
crease their investment. Workers are never rejected when making lower investments, and
therefore there must also be no incentive to decrease investment. The constraint therefore
has no effect on these marginal conditions, and therefore if ˜ σ is an equilibrium it must also
be an equilibrium in the case where the constraint is ignored. Since σ is the unique sepa-
rating equilibrium, it is also the unique separating equilibrium in this extended setting.
19From another perspective, allowing workers to reject potential coworkers places no ad-
ditional consequences on cutting investment. For example, if a worker of type θ>θ 0 cuts
their investment, they will ﬁnd that they are matched with coworkers of a lower type.
These coworkers will be glad to accept such a deviating worker because the deviator’s type
is higher than expected for their investment level. If workers of the lowest type could be
convinced to invest more than their Nash investment, then the upper-Nash investment de-
creases and marginally higher types ﬁnd that they can invest less without being matched
with θ0 workers. This logic applies to all higher types also, and in the end all workers
invest less (i.e. more efﬁciently). However, type θ0 workers can not be convinced to invest
more than their Nash level: if they did, there would exist a proﬁtable downward deviation
by cutting investment by a small enough amount that rejection is avoided. Thus, the ca-
pacity to observe the skill of potential coworkers and reject them if desired has no effect on
the behavior of the lowest types, and therefore also has no effect on any higher type.
A conclusion from this exercise is that the results are not being driven by the static
nature of the model: i.e. the same results emerge in settings where workers agents are not
forever bonded to their coworkers. Notice that this would not be true of pooling equilibria,
where potential coworkers all make the same investment but will generally be of different
types. For sufﬁciently low switching costs, there will always be incentives to reject the
lowest type workers within a group of potential coworkers. For this reason, it seems that
the focus on separating equilibria is appropriate.
5 Empirical Aspects
There are many existing explanations for the observed positive relationship between ed-
ucation and earnings. For this reason, it is important to be clear about the empirical
implications of this model, and how these differ from existing explanations.
A central prediction is that there is a causal relationship between credentials and i)
wages, and ii) productivity, for any given actual investment level. This is because cre-
dentials determine which group of coworkers a worker belongs to, thereby inﬂuencing the
worker’s productivity via spillovers. Neither of these causal relationships are present in
human capital models, since wages depend on productivity, which in turn depend on a
worker’s actual investment.14 The latter relationship is not present in signaling models;
although credentials inﬂuence beliefs and therefore wages, productivity is unaffected by
credentials. This suggests an approach that can, in principal, allow us to discriminate be-
14Similarly, neither of the relationships are operational in assignment models with observed skill (e.g. such
as Kremer (1993), Sattinger (1993), Peters and Siow (2002)) for similar reasons.
20tween theories: treat one of two otherwise similar groups of workers with pure credentials
(e.g. phony BA degrees), and examine the resulting differences in wages and productivity
between groups.15
This empirical prediction is also shared by models i) in which investment is unproduc-
tive, as in Hoppe, et al. (2009), and ii) in which ﬁrms are ex-ante heterogeneous, as in
Hopkins (2005). These explanations can potentially be disentangled by using worker-ﬁrm
matched data, as this allows for the estimation of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
The issue of whether education is productive is illuminated by examining the extent to
which educational attainment remains signiﬁcant after controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
The issue of whether ﬁrms are ex-ante heterogeneous is illuminated by examining the
extent to which coworker characteristics can explain the ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (as opposed to
characteristics such as capital per worker).
Observing a panel of matched worker-ﬁrm data allows us to go one step further and
identify worker ﬁxed effects. In this setting, Abowd et al. (1999) demonstrate how average
worker effects are much more important than average ﬁrm effects in explaining industry
effects. Explicitly analyzing the effect of coworkers, Lopes de Melo (2008) reports that
workers’ ﬁxed effects are not correlated with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, but are positively correlated
with the average ﬁxed effect of their coworkers. This type of evidence is supportive of the
notion that it is the quality of employees that really sets ﬁrms apart. The latter result
in Lopes de Melo (2008) provides valuable evidence of the type of labor market sorting
stressed in this model.
6 Conclusions
The model of credentialism developed here is based on two key assumptions regarding
skill. First, that there skill spillovers in the workplace; a worker’s productivity is inﬂu-
enced by the skill of their coworkers. Second, that skills are soft information; it is infeasi-
ble for workers to match on the basis of their skill. Instead, by allowing matches to form on
the basis of investment, I propose that investment inherits a credential quality as it acts
as a ticket to desirable coworkers. Despite similarities to models with unproductive invest-
15This is the type of variation used in Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000), who exploit the fact that U.S. states
have different test score requirements in order to be awarded the GED credential. Their key ﬁnding - that the
GED credential causes higher wages - is supportive of standard signaling models, but is also consistent with
the mechanism proposed here. Data on productivity were not available, so it is difﬁcult to distinguish the two
interpretations of the data. However, it is interesting to note that the credential effects do not appear until
ﬁve years after the test was taken. This weighs against the signaling interpretation to the extent that one
ﬁnds it implausible that discrepancies between productivity and wages can last ﬁve years.
21ment, I show that the equilibrium investment function must be discontinuous. Despite
the positive spillover, I show that over-investment is pervasive in equilibrium. Despite the
neutral nature of spillovers, I show that investment and productivity are increasing in the
degree of spillovers (but welfare is decreasing).
The model addresses a highly relevant and potent criticism of standard signaling mod-
els by eliminating any role for learning on the ﬁrms’ part through the mechanical bind-
ing of wages to productivity. Thus, in understanding credentialism, the model developed




Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof establishes that i) the necessary conditions for an equilibrium investment
function - namely, that σ(θ0)=xN(θ0), σ(θ)=t−1(θ) for θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1) where t solves the initial
values problem, along with the optimal behavior of type θ1 - are satisﬁed by a unique
function, and ii) this function constitutes an equilibrium investment function.
The solution to the initial values problem is unique, and strictly increasing for x ≥ x0.
Γ is a linear ordinary differential equation, and therefore a unique solution is guaranteed
to exist for any set of initial values (t0,x 0) such that x0 > 0. The analysis of the previous
section revealed that the initial conditions must be (θ0,x  
N(θ0)), and since x 
N(θ0) > 0,a
unique solution to the initial values problem exists. Furthermore, this solution is strictly
increasing for x>x 0 as required because the denominator of Γ is always positive and the
numerator is an increasing function at all x such that sx(x,θ) <c(since s is concave in x).
Thus, it is sufﬁcient to check that this holds at x = x0. But this is guaranteed by the fact
that x 
N(θ0) >x ∗(θ0).
The investment of the highest type: Finally, we need to determine the investment made
by workers of the highest type, θ1. The fact that σ is strictly increasing already implies
that σ(θ1) ≥ t−1(θ0), where t is the solution to the initial values problem just described.
These workers are free to choose a higher investment but will not be compensated by being
matched with a higher type (since they are already matched with coworkers of the highest
possible type). Such an upward deviation is proﬁtable if and only if φ · sx(x,θ1) >cat
x = t−1(θ0). However this can not be the case because Γ(t,x) > 0 for all t ≥ t0 (including
t = θ1). Thus, it must be the case that σ(θ1)=t−1(θ0). This type of argument can be applied
22to verify that there can never be an equilibrium investment function with a discontinuity
at some θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1).
First-order conditions are sufﬁcient: Given that a unique function satisﬁes the neces-
sary conditions, I establish that the function indeed represents an equilibrium by showing
that the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the workers’ maximization problem are also
sufﬁcient. Note that no worker prefers to invest above σ(θ1) or below σ(θ0). This follows
from single crossing, since θ1 does not prefer to invest any higher than σ(θ1), and θ0 does
not prefer to invest any lower than σ(θ0). No worker prefers to invest in (xN(θ0),x  
N(θ0)]:
holds by construction θ0 workers, and can not be true for a worker of some higher type
because they would prefer to invest marginally above x 
N(θ0). It is therefore sufﬁcient to
verify that workers do not prefer to choose some other equilibrium investment. This is
proved in two parts; ﬁrst that equilibrium investments are locally optimal, and second
that μ can not cross a worker’s equilibrium indifference curve (implying that local optima
are also global optima). First, we show that the second-order sufﬁcient condition holds at
equilibrium investments:
(1 − φ) · g  (σ(θ)) · θ + φ · μ  (σ(θ)) < 0 (21)
for all θ ∈ (θ0)θ1). The ﬁrst-order condition can be written as
(1 − φ) · g (σ(θ)) · θ + φ · μ (σ(θ)) = c, (22)
which holds uniformly in θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1). Differentiating this w.r.t. θ, dividing by σ (θ), and
re-arranging gives:




for all θ ∈ (θ0,θ 1].
Second, suppose μ crosses the equilibrium indifference curve of some type above that
type’s equilibrium investment. Since μ is differentiable on the set of equilibrium invest-
ments, the slope of μ at such a crossing point must be greater than the slope of the type’s
equilibrium indifference curve. But this then implies that the indifference curve that is
tangent to μ at the crossing point belongs to a lower type, contradicting strictly increasing
investments. The analogous argument holds for the case where μ crosses the equilibrium
indifference curve of some type below that type’s equilibrium investment.
Proof of Proposition 2
23Proof. Efﬁcient investments satisfy sx(x∗(θ),θ)=c. Using this in the expression for t (x)





The fact that investment is a strictly increasing function implies the left side is positive,
which implies that the numerator of the right side is positive (since the denominator is
always positive). But the concavity of s in x means that sx(x∗(θ),θ) >s x(σ(θ),θ) implies
σ(θ) >x ∗(θ) as required.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. An increase in φ raises the Nash investment of the lowest type. This lowers their
Nash payoff, thereby increasing the upper-Nash investment. Thus, higher spillovers in-
crease x 
N(θ0). Furthermore, Γ is strictly decreasing in φ. Together these facts imply that
the solution to the initial values problem, t(x), is shifted to the right when φ increases (i.e.
it starts at a point to the right, and never crosses the original solution since the slope is
everywhere ﬂatter). Since t(x) is the inverse investment function for θ ∈ Θ/θ0,w eh a v e
that such types invest strictly more when spillovers are higher.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First, the Nash investment approaches the efﬁcient investment as φ goes to zero. As
the efﬁcient investment produces the greatest possible payoff, the upper-Nash investment
also approaches the efﬁcient investment as φ goes to zero. Thus, the lowest type invests
efﬁciently in the limit.
Suppose that for some θ, we had σ(θ) >x ∗(θ) in the limit as φ → 0. Since both functions
are continuous, this must also hold for set of neighboring types. But then from (24) there
must be a (non-empty) set of types for which t (σ(θ)) goes to inﬁnity as φ → 0 (since the
denominator goes to zero while the numerator goes to a positive value). Thus, by making φ
sufﬁciently close to zero we can make the investments of two distinct types arbitrarily close
to each other. This is not possible in equilibrium since the lower of the types will always
have an incentive to mimic the higher of the types since a marginally higher investment
would produce a discrete increase in coworker skill.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. I show that the analysis above continues to apply under this generalization since
ρ changes neither the Nash investment, nor the initial values problem (i.e. neither the
upper-Nash investment, nor Γ).
24The Nash investment satisﬁes:
ys(sN(θ),s N(θ)) · sx(xN(θ),θ)=c, (25)
where sN(θ) ≡ s(xN(θ),θ). But since ys(z,z)=( 1− φ) for all z, we have that xN(θ) is
unaffected by ρ.
The upper-Nash investment satisﬁes
y(s 
N(θ),s  
N(θ)) − c · x 
N(θ)=y(sN(θ),s N(θ)) − cxN(θ), (26)
where s 
N(θ) ≡ s(x 
N(θ),θ). But since y(z,z)=z for all z, both sides are independent of ρ
and we conclude that x 
N(θ) is also independent of ρ.
Finally, the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal investment is
ys(s,s) · sx + y¯ s(s,s) · [sx + sθ · t (x)] = c. (27)
which uses the fact that μ (x)=sx + sθ · t (x). But since y¯ s(z,z)=φ for all z, and recalling
that ys(z,z)=( 1−φ) for all z, the differential equation describing t (x) will be independent
of ρ.
Derivation of Solution to Initial Values Problem
Proof. Let a(x) ≡
−gx(x)
φg(x) and b(x) ≡ c
φg(x), so that we can write:
t (x)=a(x) · t(x)+b(x).


















where K is a constant that adjusts so that the initial condition is satisﬁed and the notation
 x f(z)dz represents the indeﬁnite integral of f(x). Note that
 x a(z)dz = −(1/φ)ln(g(x)),
so that exp(

























For any given {t0,x 0}, we know that:









which gives the stated result once substituted.
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